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1983-1984 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
Patricia J. Youngblood* 
During 1983 and 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals decided 
significant cases raising issues of international law and of domestic 
law presented in international contexts.1 Some of the issues were 
novel,2 others were raised by novel circumstances.3 All called upon 
the courts to continue the process of refining doctrines and prin-
ciples of international law that have appeared with increasing fre-
quency in American cases.' 
I. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
A. SITUS OF THE DEBT IN FOREIGN EXPROPRIATION CASES: 
GARCIA V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK AND PEREZ V. CHASE 
MANHATTAN BANK 
In two Survey year cases, Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,5 
and Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank,6 the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the New York Court of Appeals reached opposite con-
clusions regarding the effect of a bank's payment of deposits 
represented by letters of credit to a foreign government pursuant 
to an expropriation decree, on the continued liability of the bank 
to the depositor. The conflict in the cases leaves United States banks 
unsure of the circumstances in which they may be required to pay 
*Assoc. Prof., Albany Law School of Union University; J.D. Willamette University 
College of Law, 1978; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1980. 
1. Because of the number and significance of the cases decided by these two courts 
during the Survey years, the decisions of lower federal and state courts in New York are 
not examined as part of this Survey. 
2. See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Perez v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 684, cert. denied, 53 
U.S.L.W. 3325 (1984), discussed infra at notes 5-54 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), discussed infra at notes 96-128 and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., the cases discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, infra at notes 
129-33, and the jurisdiction cases, infra at notes 211-89. 
5. Garcia, 735 F .2d at 645. 
6. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 460, 463 N.E.2d at 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 689. 
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the amount of the deposit twice and confused about the most ef-
fective way to ensure the safety of the depositor's funds while 
avoiding such double liability. 
Perez and Garcia arose out of nearly identical factual 
backgrounds. Both had their genesis in the financial concerns of 
Cuban citizens immediately prior to the overthrow of the Batista 
regime in Cuba by the forces of Fidel Castro. Juanita Gonzalez 
Garcia and her husband, seeking to safeguard their assets in the 
event that Castro took power, visited the Vedado, Cuba branch of 
Chase Manhattan Bank in May, 1958.7 They desired to make a fix-
ed time deposit of 100,000 pesos and after Chase Manhattan officials 
allegedly confirmed Garcia and her husband's belief that this would 
be a proper method to secure their assets,8 they deposited the funds 
and received a non-negotiable certificate of deposit (CD).9 The CD 
did not specify where repayment was to be effectuated but Chase 
Manhattan officials allegedly represented to Garcia and her hus-
band that repayment would be made in United States dollars in 
New York.1° Four months later, the two returned to the Vedado 
branch and deposited 400,000 pesos in exchange for a CD. Again, 
they allegedly were told that this was an appropriate way to secure 
their money, and were informed that the CD's were payable in 
United States dollars at any Chase Manhattan Bank worldwide. The 
two sent the CD's to Spain for safekeeping in December, 1958.11 
During the same six month period, Rosa Manas Y. Pineiro 
(Manas), wife of a cabinet member in the Batista government, visited 
Chase Manhattan's Mariano branch with the same financial concerns 
that had brought Garcia to the Vedado branch.12 She deposited funds 
between May and December, 1958 and received five non-negotiable 
CDs.12a Again, no place of payment was specified in the CDs but Chase 
Manhattan allegedly told Manas that the CDs could be redeemed 
at any Chase Manhattan branch worldwide.13 
7. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 646-47. 
12. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 465, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690. Perez is the ad-
ministratrix of Manas' estate. 
12a. The total amount on deposit was $227,336.47. Id. 
13. Id. 
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On January 1, 1959 Fidel Castro's forces entered Havana. Gar-
cia's husband fled to El Salvador14 and Manas' husband to Colombia.15 
Manas left Cuba in June, 1959 to visit her husband, then returned 
for four months before emigrating to the United States in 1960.16 
Garcia was unable to leave Cuba until 1964, at which time she went 
to Spain.17 
Castro's new government took varied steps to consolidate its 
power in the first few months of 1959.18 One of these steps was the 
creation of the Cuban Ministry for the Recovery of Misappropriated 
Property.19 It was empowered to freeze bank accounts as one means 
to recover misappropriated property.20 The Ministry ordered Chase 
Manhattan to freeze the accounts of, among others, Garcia, her hus-
band and Manas. In July, 1959, Chase was ordered to pay to the 
Ministry the proceeds of Garcia and her husband's accounts.21 In 
September, 1959, the same order was given as to Manas' accounts.22 
Chase Manhattan complied with both orders by remitting to the 
Ministry a sum equal to the CD deposits.23 During the next year, 
Cuba nationalized Chase Manhattan's branches and Banco Nacional 
de Cuba assumed its assets and liabilities.24 
In 1976, Garcia brought suit against Chase Manhattan in the 
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking 
the funds represented by the CDs.25 Manas brought suit in the 
Supreme Court of New York in July 1974 after Chase Manhattan 
refused payment upon presentment of the CDs.26 
14. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647. 
15. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690. 
16. Id. 
17. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647. According to Garcia, she gave the certificates to her hus-
band in 1969 when he visited her in Spain. The certificates were found in his safety deposit 
box in Puerto Rico at his death in 1975. At that time he was a resident of Puerto Rico and 
a citizen of the United States. Garcia moved to Florida in 1974. Appellee's Joint Brief at 
15, Garcia, 735 F.2d at 645. 
18. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647. 
19. Cuban Law No. 78. The text of this law can be found in Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647 n.1. 
20. Id. 
21. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647. 
22. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691. 
23. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 645; Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691. 
24. For an excellent discussion of legal issues arising from the expropriation and na-
tionalization of foreign branches of United States banks, see Logan & Kantor, Deposits at 
Expropriated Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 333 (1982). 
25. Suit was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. The trial court held for Garcia. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647-48. 
26. The trial court held for Chase Manhattan Bank. Pinero v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
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In both cases, Chase Manhattan defended that it had paid the 
deposits represented by the certificates upon order of the Cuban 
government and that the payment extinguished the debt.27 United 
States courts, argued Chase Manhattan, could not, consistent with 
the act of state doctrine, question the validity and effect of the 
Cuban government's action.28 The act of state doctrine's classic for-
mulation is found in Underhill v. Hernandez:29 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such 
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of 
by sovereign powers as between themselves.30 
This formulation speaks only to those acts done within the 
sovereign's territory. Acts of a sovereign done without its territory 
are respected only if they do not violate the law and policy of the 
United States.31 
Because of the territorial limitation on the act of state doctrine, 
Cuba's act of expropriation of the debts at issue in the instant cases 
would be effective only if the debts were present in Cuba at the 
time Cuba ordered the freezing of the Garcia and Manas accounts. 
A debt is located, for act of state purposes, anywhere the debtor 
is present and the debt is payable.32 
A divided Second Circuit, in Garcia, held that Cuba's expropria-
tion of the proceeds of Garcia and her husband's account did not 
extinguish the obligation represented by the certificates of deposit.33 
Analogizing the Cuban expropriation to the act of an armed gun-
man demanding payment from the bank, the court would not allow 
106 Misc. 2d 660 (1980). The Appellate Division reversed unanimously. Perez v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 93 A.D.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1983). 
27. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 649; Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 462. 
28. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 649. 
29. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
30. Id. at 252. 
31. See Allied Bank International v. Ban(!O Credito Agricola, discussed infra at notes 
55-69; Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 1027 (1966). 
32. Menedez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom.; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
33. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650. 
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Chase Manhattan to rely on the expropriation to avoid payment 
to the depositors because Chase Manhattan had not offered any 
resistance to the Ministry's demand, had remitted the funds to the 
Ministry without requiring presentment of the CDs and had not 
given any notice to the depositors.34 Because title to the funds vested 
in Chase Manhattan at the time the certificates were given in ex-
change for the deposits and the latter became part of the bank's 
general funds rather than funds specifically attributable to Garcia's 
account, Chase Manhattan's debt to Garcia was not extinguished 
by the payment of its general funds to the Cuban government.35 
The court recognized the general rules regarding situs of debts 
for act of state doctrine purposes.36 The court concluded, however, 
that the particular facts here, specifically Garcia's expressed reasons 
for seeking a CD and Chase Manhattan's representations, out-
weighed those facts siting the debt in Cuba that otherwise would 
suggest application of the act of state doctrine.37 Chase, through 
its representations, accepted the risk by accepting the depositor's 
funds.38 
Judge Kearse dissented based on her opinion that the act of 
state doctrine should be applied and should relieve Chase Manhat-
tan of any liability to Garcia.39 In her view, the situs of the debt 
was in Cuba and Cuba's expropriation "collected" the debt within 
its territory. Since a certificate of deposit is merely evidence of a 
debt and not the debt itself, she reasoned that Chase Manhattan's 
failure to require presentment of the certificate was immaterial, 
since Cuba impliedly did not require presentment of a debt in order 
to expropriate it.4° Absent an express agreement to honor the cer-
tificate regardless of the Cuban government's action, Judge Kearse 
would not require Chase Manhattan to suffe,r double liability on 
its debt.41 
In Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank,42 a majority of the New York 
34. Id. at 649. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 650. 
37. Id. at 650-51. 
38. Id. at 650. 
39. Id. at 651 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 652-53. 
42. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 473, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695. 
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Court of Appeals held that the act of state doctrine operated to 
shield Chase Manhattan from double liability. Manas had argued 
that because the certificates could be redeemed at any of Chase 
Manhattan's branches worldwide, the debt had multiple situses and 
therefore the normal debt situs rule should not apply to locate the 
debt in Cuba. The court disagreed. It concluded that the debt had 
multiple situses until the time of payment and that the act of pay-
ment, whether pursuant to depositor demand or government decree, 
extinguished the debt.43 
Judge Wachtler dissented on two grounds. First, he questioned 
the appropriateness of traditional situs rules where, as here, the 
application of those rules gave the debt multiple situses worldwide.44 
Such rules would support confiscation of a debt by any government 
of a state in which the debtor was located, regardless of an con-
nection among the creditor, the transaction and the confiscating 
state.45 Rules locating the situs of a debt, according to Judge 
Wachtler, should reflect broad policy considerations.46 
Judge Wachtler also questioned the relevance of the act of state 
doctrine in cases where the foreign sovereign is not a party.47 The 
issue in the instant case was whether Manas or Chase Manhattan, 
both private litigants, should suffer the loss due to Cuba's acts.48 
Wachtler concluded that since Chase Manhattan accepted Manas' 
I 
money fully aware of the political instability in Cuba and of her 
reasons for making a deposit with the bank, Chase Manhattan 
should suffer the loss. 49 
It is questionable whether the situs of the debt rules in act 
of state cases should have played a central role in either Perez or 
Garcia, involving, as they did, the rights and liabilities of private 
litigants. The act of state doctrine developed to shield the acts of 
foreign sovereigns within their territory from invalidation by United 
States courts.50 It is, in essence, a federally-mandated choice of law 
rule that requires such acts be deemed valid and effective.51 The 
43. Id. at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693. 
44. Id at 473-74, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. 
46. Id at 477, 463 N.E.2d at 13, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 479, 463 N.E.2d at 14, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
48. Id. at 473-74, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695. 
49. Id. at 479-80, 463 N.E.2d at 14-15, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89. 
50. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
51. Seen as a choice of law rule, the act of state doctrine gives conclusive effect to 
6
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doctrine is based not only upon principles of sovereignty, but also 
upon a recognition of the separate functions of each branch of the 
United States government and the respective realm of state judicial 
power and the federal executive branch.52 The judicial restraint man-
dated by the act of state doctrine reduces the chance that judicial 
decisions will embarass or hinder the executive branch in its rela-
tions with foreign sovereigns.53 None of these concerns was in issue 
in Perez or Garcia, or implicated directly in either. 
Use of the debt situs rules in these cases does, however, in-
dicate problems with the rules themselves. The rules are based on 
a single inquiry: is the debtor located and subject to suit on the 
debt in the state that is seeking to confiscate the debt? If it is 
answered affirmatively, that state may confiscate the debt, 
regardless of the absence of any other factual connections between 
the debt-creating transaction and the confiscating state. Literally 
applied, this situs rule would allow any state where the CDs at issue 
in Perez and Garcia were payable, that is, any state in which Chase 
Manhattan has a branch, to seize the funds represented by the CDs. 
Whichever state seized the debt first would extinguish it. Cuba, 
in fact, had a much stronger claim to the funds because not only 
the debtor but the creditor and the transaction were located there. 
As one author has noted, the presence of the debtor, the creditor 
and the transaction in a single state gives that state the strongest 
one contact only, the situs of the debt in the nation seizing it, and mandates the recognition 
of American courts of the act of seizure. The doctrine thus denies to courts a choice of gover-
ning law as to the validity of the sovereign's act, regardless of other arguably significant 
contacts with the forum or another state and of important governmental interests created 
thereby. The U.S. Supreme Court in Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1980), its most recent 
pronouncement on the constitutional limits imposed on a state's choice of law, rejected such 
a single factor inquiry and applied instead a standard that recognized the myriad factual 
contacts that create state interests in having their law applied. "[F]or a State's substantive 
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a signifi-
cant contact or aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 312-13. 
Certainly cases may arise compelling the conclusion that only one state has a constitu-
tionally permissible claim to application of its laws. But Allstate clearly states that, where 
significant contacts creating state interests exist in more than one state, a constitutionally per-
missible choice exists. When the litigation is between private parties, as is the case in Garcia 
and Perez, the question of applicability of the act of state doctrine could turn on exactly 
this kind of analysis. See Note, Debt Situs Standards in Cases of Foreign Expropriation, 49 
ALB. L. REv.-(1985) (unpublished). 
52. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964). 
53. Id. at 423. 
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expectation of dominion and offers the strongest claim for applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine.54 The result in Perez would have 
been more acceptable had the court recognized the multiple fac-
tors supporting the debt's situs in Cuba. 
B. THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT'S TEMPORARY PROHIBITION 
ON REPAYMENT OF EXTERNAL DEBT AND SUBSEQUENT 
RESCHEDULING AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT OF STATE 
DOCTRINE: ALLIED BANK INTERNATIONAL V. BANCO CREDITO 
AGRICOLA DE CARTAGO 
In a case of interest to United States banks, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals initially upheld55 and later, on rehearing, 
reversed56 the dismissal of an action brought by thirty-nine banks 
against three Costa Rican banks to recover over five billion dollars 
owed by the latter to the former. 
Allied Bank International brought suit as an agent of the thirty-
nine banks against the three banks, which are owned by the govern-
ment of Costa Rica and subject to the control of the Central Bank 
of Costa Rica (Central Bank). Defendant banks assumed the obliga-
tions to the thirty-nine banks in 1976 and issued new promissory 
notes. In agreements negotiated with Allied Bank in that year, the 
three Costa Rican banks were to make "unconditionally" eleven 
semi-annual payments in United States dollars in New York City.57 
The agreements further provided that Allied Bank could demand 
full payment if defendants failed to pay within thirty days of the 
specified payment date, unless the failure "was due to the omis-
sion or refusal of the Central Bank to release United States 
currency,"58 in which case default would be excused for an additional 
ten days. 
Defendant banks met their obligations under the agreements 
until 1981. In August of that year, responding to a severe economic 
crisis in Costa Rica, the Central Bank refused to release foreign 
54. Note, supra note 51, at _. 
55. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 18, 1985). 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984). 
56. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No. 83-7714 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 18, 1985). 
57. Allied Bank, 733 F.2d at 24. These agreements recognized that the obligations were 
registered with the Central Bank of Costa Rica, since that bank would provide the United 
States currency required in the agreement. 
58. Id. 
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currency for the payment of debts.59 Three months later, the Costa 
Rican government allowed banks, including defendants, to pay ex-
ternal debts only with Central Bank's approval. The presidential 
decree so announcing stated that this measure was necessary 
because "presently the Government of Costa Rica is renegotiating 
its External Debt and for this purpose there should be harmony 
of decisions and centralization in the decision-making process."60 
Upon suit in the Southern District of New York, defendants 
did not deny their failure to pay but rather moved to dismiss the 
action for lack of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction and 
for insufficiency of process and service. Allied Bank moved for sum-
mary judgment. In opposition to the latter motion, defendants 
argued that payment had been prevented by the Costa Rican 
government. The district court, in denying all of the motions, stated 
that the act of state doctrine barred entry of summary judgment 
against defendants. The action later was dismissed when the par-
ties stipulated that no factual issues with respect to the act of state 
doctrine. remained. 61 
During the pendency of the action before the lower court, 
negotiations for the rescheduling of defendants' obligations began. 
After the district court dismissed the action, defendants signed a 
refinancing agreement accepted by, inter alia, thirty-eight of the 
thirty-nine banks on whose behalf Allied Bank brought the action.62 
The economic crisis that led to the default on loans by private 
lenders also caused default on payments of Costa Rica's intergovern-
mental obligations.63 Both the United States government and other 
government creditors reacted sympathetically to Costa Rica's 
economic problems and her efforts to solve them.64 As a result, 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. Id. This agreement was signed by defendants, the Central Bank, the government 
of Costa Rica and a coordinating agent for Costa Rica's external creditors. As of the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion, defendants had made payments as required by the refinancing 
agreement. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 
424 (1961), further aid to a country granted a loan by the United States Government re-
quires that the President advise Congress that "assistance to such country is in the na-
tional interest." 22 U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1982). President Reagan so advised the Congress. Allied 
Bank, 733 F.2d at 25. The House of Representatives also expressed its support for Costa 
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several nations, including the United States, signed an agreement 
rescheduling the intergovernmental debt of Costa Rica. This agree-
ment recommended the rescheduling of Costa Rica's commercial 
debt payments. 
Thus, when Allied Bank appealed the dismissal of the action 
in the instant case to the Second Circuit, it represented the one 
bank that had refused to accept the refinanced obligation which 
the Second Circuit initially believed was not only acceptable in prin-
ciple to the United States government, but had been urged by it. 
The act of state doctrine does not mandate dismissal of an ac-
tion in an American court if the foreign state's actions affect con-
tractual obligations or property located in the United States, unless 
such actions are consistent with the policy and law of the United 
States.65 The appellate court, in its initial opinion,66 analogized Costa 
Rica's prohibition of payment of its external debts tot.he reorganiza-
tion of a business under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.67 As 
is true of Chapter 11 reorganizations domestically, "Costa Rica's 
prohibition of payment of debt was not a repudiation of the debt 
but rather was merely a deferral of payments while it attempted 
in good faith to renegotiate its obligations."68 
A motion to rehear the case was granted and the original opin-
ion withdrawn by the Second Circuit after publication of the opinion. 
On March 18, 1985 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its new 
opinion, reaching an opposite conclusion and reversing the dismissal 
below .69 The court explained that its earlier decision had been based 
primarily upon "our belief that the legislative and executive 
branches of our government fully supported Costa Rica's action and 
all of the economic ramifications."69a The amicus curiae brief filed by 
the government on rehearing indicated otherwise.69b Because it con-
Rica. Id.; H. Con. Res. 423, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REC. H.10206 (Dec. 17, 1982); H. Con. 
Res. 194, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REC. H.10350 (Nov. 17, 1983). 
65. Allied Bank, 733 F.2d at 26. United States v. Belmont, 301U.S.324 (1937); Canada 
Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical 
Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Interna-
tional Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). 
66. Allied Bank, 733 F.2d at 26. 
67. Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). 
68. Allied Bank, 733 F .2d at 26. 
69. Allied Bank, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. Mar 18, 1985). 
69a. Slip op. at 6. 
69b. Id. 
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eluded its earlier interpretation of United States policy had been 
wrong, the court was required to examine whether the act of state 
doctrine nonetheless precluded examination of the Costa Rican 
decrees. Since the situs of the debt at issue was not in Costa Rica, 
the act of the Costa Rican government was not a taking within its 
own territory and the act of state doctrine was inapplicable.69cThis 
opinion was issued in 1985 immediately before this Survey was to 
be published. The opinion will be analyzed in depth in the 1985 
Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit, which will be 
published by this journal next year. 
C. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR ENFORCEMENT 
OF CIVIL INVESTIGATION DEMANDS BY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN 
ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION: ASSOCIATED CONTAINER 
TRANSPORTATION, LTD. V. UNITED STATES 
In Associated Container Transportation, Ltd. v. United States,10 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impres-
sion involving the scope of the act of state doctrine: whether the 
doctrine prohibited the courts from enforcing a Justice Department 
request for communications between three corporations and govern-
mental bodies in Australia and New Zealand. The appellate court 
reversed the lower court and held that the doctrine did not bar 
such enforcement in the instant case. 71 
The case arose out of an investigation by the United States 
Department of Justice into possible antitrust violations by carriers 
of meat, livestock and wool to the United States from Australia 
and New Zealand. Appellees in the case were three of the companies 
targeted in the investigation.72 
All three companies are members of various shipping confer-
ences and agreements. As members, appellees enter into written 
agreements governing international shipping that are subject to 
approval by the United States Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), 
pursuant to the Shipping Act.73 Agreements made lawful by the 
69c. Id. at 12. 
70. 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983). 
71. Id. at 55. 
72. Id. Associated Container Transportation, Ltd. is organized under the laws of the 
United Kingdom, Hamburg-Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft, Eggert & 
Amsinck under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Farrell Lines, Inc. under 
the laws of the State of New York. 
73. Id. at 55-56; 46 U.S.C. § 814. 
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Shipping Act are immune from antitrust laws.74 The focus of the 
Justice Department's inquiry was activities of appellees and others 
outside this exemption. 
In May and June, 1980, the Justice Department issued Civil 
Investigation Demands (CIDs) pursuant to the Antitrust Civil Pro-
cess Act.75 The government requested detailed information regard-
ing, inter alia, communications between appellees and the Federal 
Maritime Commission, appellees and the Australian Meat and Live-
stock Corporation (AMLC) and between appellees and the New 
Zealand Wool Board (NZWB).76 The latter entities are instrumen-
talities of their respective governments.77 
Each of the appellees filed a petition to set aside the CIDs.78 
In most respects, the lower court ordered the CIDs enforced;79 
however, in two significant respects, one of which is relevant here, 
the district court denied enforcement. 
First, the district judge accepted appellee's argument that their 
communications with the Federal Maritime Commission were 
beyond government scrutiny under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
a judicially-created doctrine that immunizes joint efforts to influence 
passage of laws from antitrust prosecution.80 Second, the district 
court refused to allow the government to investigate the appellees' 
communications with the AMLC and the NZWB, on the basis that 
such an investigation "would require the court to question the 
motives of foreign governmental bodies responsible for selecting 
the ocean carriers able to transport goods from their respective 
countries."81 
The United States appealed. Recognizing that "the unmistak-
able purpose of the Antitrust Civil Practice Act was to facilitate 
the Justice Department's efforts to obtain evidence during the 
74. 46 u.s.c. § 814. 
75. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 56; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1982). A CID is a form 
of pretrial discovery for the benefit of the Attorney General. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a). 
76. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 56. 
77. Id. 
78. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b). 
79. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 56. 
80. Id.; Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
81. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 57. The district court judge relied upon Hunt 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). In that case, the 
Second Circuit court interpreted the act of state doctrine to prohibit United States courts 
from probing the motives of foreign governments. 
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course of a civil investigation,"82 the Second Circuit reversed both 
reasons for denying enforcement.83 
The appellate court labeled appellees' invocation of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine premature. Recognizing that "[t]he mere fact 
that a lawsuit involves activities abroad ... does not imply that 
American courts are without jurisdiction,"8' the court held the act 
of state doctrine was not implicated by the government's attempts 
to enforce the CIDs.85 The Antitrust Division was not asking the 
court to question the validity of a foreign government's actions or 
to evaluate the propriety of a foreign government's decision.86 Ap-
pellees had argued that the investigation necessarily would involve 
an examination of the motives of the AMLC and the NZWB.87 They 
cited as support a Second Circuit case, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,88 
in which the court had held that inquiry into the motives of a foreign 
government implicated the act of state doctrine. In Hunt, the ap-
pellate court upheld dismissal of a claim because the claim "is ... 
not viable unless the judicial branch examines the motivation of 
the [foreign government's] action and that inevitably involves its 
invalidity ."89 The court easily distinguished Associated Container 
from Hunt. First, in Hunt the antitrust suit had been brought, 
82. Associated Container, 705 F .2d at 58. 
83. Id. at 62. Regarding the Noerr-Pennington exemption, the court reasoned that, while 
the exemption might eventually be held to apply to appellee's actions, it did not apply at 
this investigatory stage. 
The House report accompanying the 1976 amendments to the Antitrust Civil 
Process Act does indicate that a CID recipient may refuse to comply with any CID 
"if the Division has no jurisdiction to conduct an investigation-which will be the 
case if the activities at issue enjoy a clear exemption from the antitrust laws." H. 
Rep. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11 (1976) (emphasis added), reprinted in (1976] 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2606. 
That discussion goes on to provide, however, that 
the committee stresses that the scope of many antitrust exemptions is not precise-
ly clear; and many others, especially those among the regulated industries and what 
were formally term[ed] "the learned professions" are currently being narrowed 
by statute or judicial [r]ulings. In these many cases, the applicability of an asserted 
exemption may well be a central issue in the case. If so, the mere assertion of the 
exemption should not be allowed to halt the investigation. Id. n.30 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 59. The court believed the Noerr-Pennington immunity to be far from clear. 
84. Associated Container, 705 F .2d at 61. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Hunt, 550 F.2d at 68. 
89. Id. at 77. 
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whereas in Associated Container the government had not yet deter-
mined whether to bring formal charges.90 Second, in order to prove 
their case, plaintiffs in Hunt were required to show that the defen-
dant's conspiracy had caused the foreign government to confisicate 
their property, thus motive was a central issue in the case.91 In 
Associated Container the Justice Department could prove "that ap-
pellees attempted to monopolize the market for shipping certain 
commodities ... without making any claims concerning the acts 
or motivations" of the foreign governments.92 Thus, the court could 
not determine at such an early stage in the proceedings whether 
any court would be called upon to investigate the validity of the 
actions taken by the governments of Australia and New Zealand.93 
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals made clear 
that its holding should not be read to indicate that the act of state 
doctrine might not properly be involved later in the proceedings.94 
What is equally clear from the opinions in Perez v. Chase Manhattan95 
and Associated Container is that the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals views the act of state doctrine as limited in its scope to those 
cases in which the judicial branch is required to inquire into the 
validity of a foreign sovereign's action. 
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSAL DOES NOT 
REQUIRE SHOWING OF AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM: 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. PAHLAVI 
The Iranian hostage crisis96 and the agreement between the gov-
ernments of the United States and Iran that ended it97 continue to 
90. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 62. 
91. Hunt, 550 F.2d at 76. 
92. Associated Container, 705 F .2d at 62. 
93. Id. Challenges to CIDs by other carriers_ were rejected by other courts on similar 
grounds. Pacific/Australia-New Zealand Conference v. United States, Nos. 80-3015, 3016-3382 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, l982), appeal dismissed, Nos. 82-4205, 4218-4219 (9th Cir. May 17, 1982); 
Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 
1982), appeal argued, Nos. 82-1516, 1683 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 1983). 
94. Associated Container, 705 F.2d at 62. 
95. Perez, 735 F.2d at 645. See supra notes 5-54 and accompanying text. 
96. On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran was seized and 
American diplomatic personnel were captured by militant Iranian students. Fifty-two of 
the hostages were held by the Iranian government for 444 days. 
97. On January 20, 1981, the governments of Iran and the United States entered into 
the agreement under which the hostages were released. The agreement was embodied in 
two declarations: Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of Algeria and Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
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generate challenging legal questions for American courts. In Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,98 the New York Court of Appeals faced 
two issues, one involving the scope of the hostage release agree-
ment between the United States and Iran, and the other involving 
the appropriateness of a forum non conveniens dismissal absent proof 
of the availability of an alternative forum. 
Iran brought suit in New York state court against Mohammed 
Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, and his wife, Farrah Diba 
Pahlavi. The complaint alleged that the Pahlavis had diverted to 
their own use, funds and property worth several billion dollars 
belonging to the people and government of Iran.99 Based upon the 
Pahlavi's alleged breach of their fiduciary duties imposed by Iranian 
law, Iran sought both legal and injunctive relief.100 
The case was commenced in November, 1979, while the Shah 
was receiving treatment for cancer at a New York hospital.101 The 
defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens 
was granted by the Supreme Court sitting at Special Term in 
the County of New York.102 That court found that New York was 
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 20 l.L.M. 223-40 (1981). 
98. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 
597 (1984). 
99. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1981, at 6, col. 3, (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct.). 
100. Specifically, Iran sought the imposition of a constructive trust upon and an ac-
counting of all assets held by the Pahlavis as individuals or in the family's foundations, cor-
porations and associations; an injunction against any sale, transfer, removal, disposal or altera-
tion of such assets; compensatory damages of $25 billion against the Pahlavis, and recovery 
of $30 billion allegedly converted by the Pahlavis. See id. 
101. Substituted service on the Shah was accomplished at New York Hospital. The Em-
press was served personally. Id. In addition to their motion to dismiss on grounds of forum 
non conveniens, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied 
the latter ground for dismissal, holding that defendants' physical presence in New York 
was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction and that the method of service on the Shah was 
reasonably calculated to give notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 7, col. 1. Defen-
dants' third ground for dismissal, that the action involved a non-justiciable political ques-
tion, also was rejected by the court. At its core, the action sought a constructive trust, an 
accounting, an injunction and money damages, and thus was justiciable. Id. at 7 col. 2. 
The Shah died in Egypt in July, 1980 while these motions were pending at Special 
Term. New York's Civil Practice Rules provide for substitution of a party who dies; no such 
substitution was made for the Shah. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. R. § 1015 (McKinney 1976). 
102. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, N.Y.L.J., Sept.16, 1981, at 7, col. 3. Iran brought 
a similar action against Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's sister. Defendant in that action moved 
to dismiss the complaint against her on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction due 
to the presence of non-justiciable political questions, "unclean hands", and forum non con-
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an inappropriate forum because the case "has no connection with 
New York and none is alleged .... An unneccessarily heavy burden 
would be placed on the courts of New York to accept jurisdiction 
of a suit between nonresident parties on a cause of action having 
no nexus with this State."103 
The Appellate Division104 and New York Court of Appeals105 
affirmed the lower court's decision. The precise issue before the 
high court in reviewing the forum non conveniens dismissal was 
whether the trial court had abused its discretion, as a matter of 
law, in granting theforum non conveniens motion in the absence of 
proof of an alternative forum.106 The court held that no such abuse 
had been committed, stating "although the existence of a suitable 
alternative forum is a most important factor to be considered in 
applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, its alleged absence here 
veniens. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 116 Misc. 2d 590, 455 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1982), rev'd, 
99 A.D.2d 1009, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1st Dep't 1984). Defendant argued that the action involved 
a non-justiciable political question because it involved the internal affairs of a foreign na-
tion. Among other reasons, the court rejected this argument based upon the terms of the 
agreement entered into by Iran and the United States under which the American hostages 
were released. Id. at 596-97, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 991-92; see supra, note 99 and infra notes 117-22 
and accompanying text. 
Defendant further argued that the court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction due to 
the "unclean hands" of plaintiff. Specifically, she argued that the demands made by the plain-
tiff after seizure of the American hostages included transfer of the Shah's assets and that 
such self-help constituted conduct so immoral and unconscionable that plaintiffs 
action should be dismissed on the basis of the equitable doctrine that one who has 
'unclean hands' will be denied relief by a court of equity. 
Pahlavi, 116 Misc. 2d at 597, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 992. Applying the New York rule that "the 
unclean hands doctrine bars only causes of action founded in illegality or immorality," the 
court held that Iran's seizure of the hostages was not directly or indirectly concerned with 
the subject matter of the action, the conduct of the defendant and the Shah during the Shah's 
rule. Id. at 598-99, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 993 (quoting Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chuzanof, 13 N.Y.2d 
282, 285 (1964)). Denying the relief on this ground also would contravene the Iranian hostage 
agreement. 116 Misc. 2d at 599, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 993. See supra note 86 and infra notes 117-22 
and accompanying text. 
The court then turned to the third ground.forum non conveniens. Here the court respect-
fully disagreed with the Pahlavi trial court's resolution of the issue in Iran's suit against 
the Shah and his wife. Holding that a forum non conveniens dismissal presupposes the ex-
istence of an alternative forum, the court denied the motion, finding that no such other forum 
existed. Id. at 601, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 994. This finding was subsequently overturned on ap-
peal. Pahlavi, 99 A.D.2d at 1010, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 802. 
103. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, N.Y.L.J., Sept.16, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). 
104. Pahlavi, 94 A.D.2d at 374, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 487. 
105. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d at 474, 467 N.E.2d at 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (1984). 
106. Id. at 483-84; 467 N.E.2d at 250, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
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does not require the court to retain jurisdiction."107 The lower court 
had appropriately concluded that Iran's interests in litigating the 
case in New York108 were outweighed by the public interests of New 
York109 and the private interest of the defendants.110 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court 
to forego the exercise of otherwise appropriate jurisdiction 
where the court, in its discretion, determines that entertain-
ment of the action in another forum is appropriate. m Prior 
to Pahlavi, cases decided by both New York112 and fed-
107. Id. at 483, 467 N.E.2d at 249, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
108. The major interests of Iran in litigating in New York were the existence of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant there and the lack of another forum. Id. at 482, 467 
N.E.2d at 248, 249, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 600, 601. 
109. Among the public interests of the State of New York in refusing jurisdiction were 
the financial and administrative burden on New York in litigating a case with no connec-
tion to the state and the fact that a judgment would likely be ineffectual because of dif-
ficulties in imposing a constructive trust on the Shah's assets. Id. at 482, 467 N.E.2d at 250, 
478 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
110. The private interests of the defendants in avoiding suit in New York involved the 
probable problems of preparing a defense when witnesses and evidence were in Iran and 
beyond the mandate of a New York court. Id. 
111. 62 N.Y.2d at 478-79, 467 N.E.2d at 247, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 599. Here jurisdiction over 
the defendants was accomplished by personal and substituted service upon them in New 
York. See supra note 101. 
112. Early New York cases discussing forum non conveniens treat the doctrine as one 
grounded in the public interests of the state. An early example is Ferguson v. Neilson, 58 
Hun. 604, 11 N.Y.S. 524 (1890) in which the New York court stated: 
It is the well-settled rule of this state that, unless special reasons are shown to 
exist which make it necessary or proper to do so, the courts will not retain jurisdic-
tion of and determine actions between parties residing in another state for per-
sonal injuries received in that state .... Our courts are not supported by the peo-
ple for any such purpose. 
Id. at 604, 11 N.Y.S. at 524; see also Burdick v. Freeman, 46 Hun. 138, 120 N.Y. 420 (1890), 
Collard v. Beach, 81A.D.582, 81N.Y.S.619 (1903), Hoes v. N.Y.N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 173 N.Y. 
435, 66 N.E. 119 (1903), Hatfield v. Sisson, 28 Misc. 255, 59 N.Y.S. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1899). Where 
either party was a resident of the state, however, the court was precluded from dismissing 
on forum non conveniens grounds. De la Bouillerie v. DeVienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 
(1949), reargument denied, 300 N.Y. 644, 90 N.E.2d 496 (1950). 
Recently, the New York courts have applied a more flexible approach to forum non 
conveniens issues, considering both private and public interests. See Silver v. Great American 
Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972). Noting that the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens rests upon "considerations of justice, fairness, and convenience, 
and not solely on the residence of one of the parties," the court dismissed a suit by a non-
resident against a New York corporation. Id. at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
See also, Varkonyi v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense, 22 N.Y.2d 333, 239 N.E.2d 
542, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1968). 
This flexible approach was codified in Civil Practice Rule 327, which provides, 
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should 
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eral113 courts indicated confusion as to whether availability of an 
alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite to a forum non con-
veniens dismissal. What is surprising, in light of this confusion, 
is not the result reached by the Pahla.vi court but the breadth 
of the holding when a narrower ground was available to the court. 
Clearly the court's rejection of a rule requiring proof of an alter-
native forum is supported by valid sovereign concerns. A state's 
judiciary ought not to be burdened by litigation that has neither 
party nor transaction contacts with the state. In Pahlavi, however, 
the absence of an alternative forum largely was due to the ac-
tion of Iran, the party seeking to defeat the forum non conveniens 
motion. Thus, the court could have held that, where the lack of 
an alternative forum is attributable to the plaintiff, any argument 
that the absence of such a forum precludes a forum non conve-
niens dismissal will be unavailing. The Court of Appeals did 
recognize this factor: 
If the action cannot be maintained in Iran, however, under laws 
which result in judgments cognizable in the United States or other 
foreign jurisdictions where the Shah's assets may be found then 
that failure must be charged to plaintiff .... Any infirmity in plain-
tiffs legal system should weigh against its claim of venue, not im-
pose disadvantage on defendant or the judicial system of this 
State.114 
Regardless of the broad language of its holding, Pahlavi should 
be read as limited to its facts. The conclusion that New York courts 
be heard in another forum, the court on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss 
the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. The domicile 
or residence in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court 
from staying or dismissing the action. 
N.Y. C1v. PRAC. R. 327 (McKinney 1972). The recent cases do not mandate an alternative forum, 
but in each there was such a forum. Rule 327 does not expressly require an alternate forum, 
but the phrase "the action should be heard in another forum" suggests the necessity of an 
alternate forum. 
113. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the United States Supreme Court 
expressly authorized forum non conveniens dismissals in federal courts, although lower federal 
courts had been dismissing on such grounds long before Gilbert. 
In Gilbert, the Court stated what has been considered the general rule that forum non 
conveniens dismissals require two fora. Id. at 506. See also, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235 (1981); North Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Glicken 
v. Bradford, 204 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Odita v. Elder Dempster Lines, Ltd., 286 F. 
Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
114. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d at 482, 467 N.E.2d at 250, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
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will make forum non conveniens dismissals in the absence of alter-
native fora, even in suits between non-resident aliens, is premature. 
Fortunately,forum non conveniens dismissals are discretionary 
with the trial courts and the presence or absence of an alternative 
forum will be only one of many considerations. Thus, in future cases, 
like Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,115 involving many of the same litigational 
factors that underlay the forum non conveniens dismissal in Pahlavi, 
forum non conveniens motions are likely to be denied. Despite the 
fact that witnesses and evidence are present in another forum, that 
the laws of a foreign state may govern and that there is no rela-
tionship between New York and either the parties or the transac-
tion, "where the basis of the suit is the violation of the law of na-
tions, requiring, as it does, a severe personal wrong committed by 
a government official within the alternative forum, the court may 
be predisposed to retain jurisdiction."116 
Having decided that the normally applicable rules regarding 
forum non conveniens dismissals did not require a reversal, the Court 
of Appeals turned to the issue of whether the terms of the hostage 
release agreement117 compelled a reversal.118 Iran argued that, in 
the agreement and in promises made by American officials prior 
to the hostages' release, the United States guaranteed to Iran an 
American forum for its claims against the Shah's family. Specifically, 
it argued that Point IV of the Declaration of the Government of 
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria obliged the United 
States to provide a forum for Iran's claims.119 Point IV, inter alia, 
obligates the United States to: 
make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, that in any litigation 
[brought by Iran to recover property and assets of the former Shah 
and his family], the claims of Iran should not be considered legally 
barred either by sovereign immunity principles or by the act of 
state doctrine .... "120 
The court had no difficulty interpreting the agreement and the 
extraneous evidence to determine that the United States did not 
115. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
116. Youngblood, 1980 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit, 8 SYR. J. INT'L 
L. & COM. 159, 203 (1980). 
117. See supra note 97. 
118. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d at 484, 476 N.E.2d at 251, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 603. 
119. Id. 
120. I.L.M. 223, 228 (1981). 
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guarantee Iran a New York forum to litigate its claims:121 
The United States has met its commitment to "facilitate,, this 
lawsuit by freezing the Shah's assets and by advising the courts 
that the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity principles 
are not to apply to plaintiffs claim. Nothing in the record or in 
its communication to the trial court suggests that a promise was 
made that it or the courts would do more.122 
Judge Meyer dissented. He would hold that the existence of 
an alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite to a forum non con-
veniens dismissal.123 The majority, in Judge Meyer's opinion, ignored 
the most relevant section of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
Second, 124 ignored an important footnote in the most recent pro-
nouncement of the United States Supreme Court on the subject 
of forum non conveniens,125 ignored the language and legislative 
history of the statutory rule governing forum non conveniens 
dismissals in New Y ork126 and reached a conclusion inconsistent with 
that of the majority of jurisdictions.127 Concluding, as he did, that 
121. Pahlvai, 62 N.Y.2d at 487, 467 N.E.2d at 252, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 604. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 487-88, 467 N.E.2d at 253, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. According to Section 84 of the Restatement, "[a] state will not exercise jurisdic-
tion if it is a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more 
appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff." An interpretative comment to this section 
indicates that a state must entertain the suit, no matter how inappropriate the forum may 
be, if jurisdiction over the defendant cannot be obtained in another state. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF LAWS s 84, Comment c (1971). 
125. Judge Meyer points to language in both Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507, and Piper 
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 indicating the need for an alternative forum. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 
at 487, 467 N.E.2d at 253, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
126. 62 N.Y.2d at 489-91, 467 N.E.2d at 254-55, 478 N.Y.S.2d 606-07. Here, Judge Meyer 
analyzes CPLR 327. He points out that the reference to "another forum" presupposes that 
there is another forum. Id. The report of the Judicial Conference recommending the addition 
of 327 to the CPLR stated that jurisdiction might be denied upon a finding "that the forum 
is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the action and that a more appropriate forum is 
available." 17 Ann. Rept. of N.Y. Jud. Con. A35 (1972). Judge Meyer finds further support 
for the proposition that an alternative forum is a prerequisite to a forum non conveniens 
motion in the relationship between CPLR 327 and the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act, which evidences "that the convenience of the court alone was never intended 
to have the importance which the majority opinion attributes to it." 62 N.Y.2d at 490, 467 
N.E.2d at 254, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 606. In his opinion, the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
New York is "not a technique for leaving unpopular litigants without a court to press their 
claims." Id. at 491, 467 N.E.2d at 255, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
127. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d at 493, 467 N.E.2d at 256, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (Meyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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the trial court should be reversed on the issue of forum non con-
veniens, Judge Meyer was not required to discuss the issue of 
whether the hostage release agreement required New York to 
entertain this action. He noted, without discussion, that he dissented 
from the majority's conclusion on that issue as well.128 
III. IMMUNITY 
A. IMPLICIT WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE UNDER 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: CANADIAN 
OVERSEAS ORES, LTD. V. COMPAGNIA DE ACERO DEL PACIFICO 
In Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compagnia de Acero del 
Pacifico, 129 the Second Circuit considered when the defense of 
sovereign immunity is waived as a matter of law under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act. The defendant, Compagnia de Acero del 
Pacifico (CAP), a government-owned130 Chilean corporation, while 
expressing an intention to preserve its defense of sovereign 
immunity131 filed a number of motions in federal court132 and engaged 
in discovery133 before formally raising, by motion, its defense of 
128. Id. 
129. 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984). This case originally was brought in New York State 
Supreme Court by an assignee of Canadian Overseas Ores, Limited [CANOVER] to recover 
damages for equipment, spare parts and loans delivered to defendant Compagnia de Acero 
del Pacifico [CAP] by CANOVER's predecessor. The case was removed to federal court upon 
defendant's motion. Canadian Overseas Ores v. Compagnia de Acero del Pacifico, 528 F. 
Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
130. A controlling interest in CAP was owned by the Chilean government. Canadian 
Ores, 727 F.2d at 275. The fact that a majority of shares or other ownership interest is owned 
by a foreign state renders a business enterprise an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state under the FSIA .. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(l) (1982). Such an agency or instrumentality is 
entitled to claim immunity to the same extent as the foreign state itself. Id. at§§ 1603(b)(l), 
1604. 
131. Canadian Ores, 727 F.2d at 275-76. 
132. Id. First, CAP filed a motion to remove the case to federal court. In the motion 
to remove "CAP noted, however, that it might later be entitled to assert the defense of 
sovereign immunity." Id. at 275. Later, "CAP waived certain procedural defenses ... pur-
suant to a stipulation in which CANOVER acknowledge CAP had not waived any procedural 
or substantive defenses not set forth in the stipulation. Sovereign immunity was not among 
the defenses set forth in the stipulation." Id. at 276. Two months later, CAP filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non 
conveniens. Id.; FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6). 
133. Before deciding CAP's motion to dismiss .for failure .to state a claim and for forum 
non conveniens the trial judge, having informally apprised the parties he would deny the 
forum non conveniens motion, directed the parties to go forward with discovery, which both 
parties did. Canadian Ores, 727 F.2d at 276. 
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sovereign immunity. The plaintiff, Canadian Overseas Ores, Limited 
(CANOVER), objected to the motion on the ground that CAP's con-
duct, specifically the filing of various motions, constituted an im-
plicit waiver of the defense.134 The trial court granted CAP's mo-
tion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, finding that 
the defense had not been waived.135 The Second Circuit affirmed.136 
Section 1605 of the FSIA provides in relevant part: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... 
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity 
either explicitly or by implication .... 137 
The defense of sovereign immunity is unique in that it is clearly 
conceived by the FSIA as a question of a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction138 and yet, unlike defenses to subject matter jurisdic-
tion generally, 139 this defense can be waived by the party entitled 
to assert it. This waivability of the immunity defense makes it more 
akin to a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person than lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter.140 The personal quality of 
the immunity defense, reflected in its waivability, makes it more 
difficult to determine when the defense is waived by implication. 
Section 1608(d) of the FSIA requires that the foreign state 
serve an answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint 
within sixty days after service is effected.141 The legislative history 
of § 1605 expressly states that the failure to raise the defense of 
sovereign immunity in a responsive pleading would constitute an 
implicit waiver of the defense.142 Thus, under the FSIA, had CAP 
filed an answer or other responsive pleading to CANOVER's com-
plaint, without raising the defense of sovereign immunity, that 
defense would have been lost to it. The issue before the court was 
whether the various motions filed by CAP constituted responsive 
134. Canadian Ores, 528 F. Supp. at 1343. 
135. Id. at 1347. 
136. Canadian Ores, 727 F .2d at 277. 
137. 28 u.s.c. § 1605 (1982). 
138. 28 u.s.c. § 1330 (1982). 
139. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3). 
140. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
141. 28 u.s.c. § 1608(d) (1976). 
142. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6617. 
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pleadings which, in failing to include the immunity defense, operated 
to waive it. 
The court's task would have been simpler if the FSIA defined 
responsive pleading; it does not. Because it believed the FSIA is 
to be interpreted in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (FRCP),143 the court examined how the waiver issue would 
be resolved under those rules.144 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 governs what defenses can 
be made by either motion or pleading, how they are to be made, 
and when they must be made. Two subsections of Rule 12 are rele-
vant to the waiver issue in Canadian Overseas Ores. Rule 12(b) in-
dicates that, with the exception of enumerated defenses, including 
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, that may be made 
by motion, all defenses to a claim for relief must be asserted in the 
responsive pleading.145 The language and intent of Rule 12(b) indicate 
that a motion is not a responsive pleading.146 FRCP 12(h)(l) provides 
that certain defenses, including jurisdiction over the person, are 
waived if a Rule 12 motion was made, and these defenses were not 
included in the motion147 or no Rule 12 motion was made, and these 
defenses were not included in the responsive pleading.148 FRCP 
12(h)(3) provides: "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the par-
ties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action."149 Thus, if Canadian 
143. Canadian Ores, 727 F.2d at 278. Plaintiff contended that interpreting the FSIA 
in light of the federal rules was inappropriate. Id. at 277. The court looked to, and found, 
support for its conclusion in the legislative history of the FSIA. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. FED. R. Crv. P.12(b). Also enumerated in this subsection are: improper venue (12(b)(3)); 
insufficiency of process (12(b)(4)); insufficiency of service of process (12(b)(5)); failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted (12(b)(6)); and failure to join a party under Rule 
19 (12(b)(7)). 
146. Not only does Rule 12(b) suggest that motions are not subsumed under the label 
"responsive pleading," other sub-parts of Rule 12 distinguish the two. See, e.g. FED. R. Crv. 
P. 12(d) "whether made in a pleading or by motion;" 12(f) "if no responsive pleading is per-
mitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party;" 12(h)(l) "neither made by motion in 
a responsive pleading." 
147. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(l); 12(g). The latter subsection provides in pertinent part: 
A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it any other motions 
herein provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under 
this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to him which 
this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion 
based on the defense or objection so omitted .... 
148. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(l). 
149. Id. at 12(h)(3). 
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Overseas Ores were decided solely by reference to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the question of waiver would turn on whether 
the sovereign immunity defense is truly addressed to the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the court or more akin to a defense directed 
to lack of jurisdiction over the person. If the former, then the 
defense was not waived by CAP; if the latter, then the failure of 
CAP to include the defense in its motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim150 resulted in a waiver of the sovereign immunity 
defense. 
The Second Circuit concluded that, despite its waivability, the 
defense of sovereign immunity is a subject matter defense,151 which, 
if governed solely by the FRCP, would fall within Rule 12(h)(3): 
Rule 12(h)(3) explicitly indicates that objections to subject matter 
jurisdiction may be made at any time during trial or appeal. The 
exceptional waivability of sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional 
defense suggests that the FSIA should be read to modify Rule 
12(h)(3) only to the extent that the FSIA automatically bars asser-
tion of the defense only after a responsive pleading has been filed. 152 
FRCP 12 clearly distinguishes between motions and responsive 
pleadings, indicating that the former is not subsumed under the 
latter for purposes of the rule. Canadian Overseas Ores clearly 
establishes that motions are not responsive pleadings for purposes 
of § 1605. 
B. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT: S 
& S MACHINERY Co. V. MASINEXPORTIMPORT AND O'CONNELL V. 
M. V. AMERICANA 
Section 1610(d)(l) of the FSIA governs immunity from prejudg-
ment attachment against the property of a foreign state. Unlike 
the section governing immunity from attachment in aid of 
execution,153 this section requires an explicit waiver of immunity 
150. Canadian Ores, 727 F.2d at 276. 
151. Id. at 277. 
152. Id. at 278. 
153. 28 U .S.C. § 1610(a) (1976). This subsection in pertinent part provides: 
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for a commer-
cial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of 
execution, or from execution ... if-
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of ex-
ecution or from execution either explicitly or by implication .... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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by the foreign state.154 The Second Circuit made clear in Libra Bank, 
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,155 a 1982 FSIA case, that § 
1610(d)(l) "does not require verbatim recitation or express enumera-
tion of immunity from prejudgment attachment as one of the waived 
immunities."156 In Libra Bank, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, an in-
strumentality of the government of Costa Rica, signed promissory 
notes with Libra Bank and others in which Banco Nacional waived 
"any right or immunity from legal proceedings including suit judg-
ment and execution on grounds of sovereignty which it or its prop-
erty may now or hereafter enjoy."157 The sole question was whether 
this language constituted an explicit waiver of immunity from pre-
judgment attachment of Banco Nacional's property. The court con-
cluded that it did and upheld the attachment.158 In so concluding, 
the court noted that the purpose of § 1610(d)(l) was "to preclude 
inadvertent, implied or constructive waiver [of immunity] where 
the intent of the foreign state is equivocal or ambiguous."159 Banco 
Nacional's waiver was clear and unambiguous and was "intended 
to reserve no rights of immunity in any legal proceedings."160 
In two cases, decided during the Survey years, the Second Cir-
cuit again was asked to determine whether foreign states had ex-
plicitly, waived their immunity from prejudgment attachment.161 In 
S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, Masinexportimport 
154. Id. at § 1610(d)(l). 
155. 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982). Libra Bank arose out of the making of a $40 million 
loan to defendant Banco Nacional de Costa Rica by sixteen banks. The complaint alleged 
that Banco Nacional defaulted in payment on the loan. After the New York Supreme Court 
issued an order to show cause why an order should not be granted attaching the property 
of Banco Nacional in New York State, the court ordered attachment on default in November 
1981. After the sheriff levied on Banco Nacional's property, the bank removed the action 
to the federal court and at the same time moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and to vacate the order of attachment. After a hearing on the motion to vacate the attach-
ment order, the district court held that the defendant's waiver was not explicit within the 
meaning of § 1610(dX1) and.vacated the attachment. Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, 
which reversed. Id. at 48-49. 
156. Libra Bank, 676 F.2d at 49. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 161 (1983); O'Connell v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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(Masin) and the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade, both instrumen-
talities of the Romanian Government, 162 argued that their immuni-
ty from prejudgment attachment had not been waived in a United 
States-Romania trade agreement.163 The clause provided: 
Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of either 
Party shall be afforded access to all courts, and ... they shall not 
claim or enjoy immunities from suit or execution of judgment or 
other liability in the territory of the other Party with respect to 
commercial or financial transactions ... except as may be provided 
in other bilateral agreements.164 
The court concluded that the waiver of immunity from suit or ex-
ecution of judgment did not constitute a waiver of immunity from 
prejudgment attachment.165 The only language that could be con-
strued as an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attach-
ment was the phrase "other liability in the territory of the other 
Party."166 The court noted that the United States-Romania Trade 
Agreement did not disclose the meaning of the category "other 
liability" but that an identical clause in the Treaty of Amity be-
tween the United States and Iran167 had been interpreted in dicta 
in Libra Bank not to be an explicit waiver of immunity from pre-
judgment attachment.168 While recognizing that its decision in S & 
S Machinery did not require a definition of the precise nature of 
prejudgment attachment, the court stated: 
The phrase "other liability" is ill-suited to encompass prejudgment 
attachments. As we pointed out in Libra Bank, it is by no means 
clear that prejudgment attachments are liabilities. The better view 
seems to be that such attachments, outside of their now-discredited 
162. S & S Machinery, 706 F.2d at 412. The plaintiffs had argued that Masinexportim-
port (Masin) and the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade were not agencies or instrumen-
talities of the Romanian government. The-essence of plaintiffs argument was that the proof 
offered at trial on the issue of foreign state status of both defendants failed to establish 
that they were organs of the Romanian state or that they were owned by Romania. The 
district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed. Id. at 414-i5. 
163. Agreement on Trade Relations, signed at Bucharest, April 2, 1975, United States-
Romania, art. IV, para. 2, 26 U.S.T. 2305, T.l.A.S. No. 8159, at 2308 (effective Aug. 3, 1975). 
164. Id. art. V., para 2. 
165. S & S Machinery, 706 F.2d at 417. 
166. Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 163. 
167. Treaty of Amity, Signed at Tehran, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. XI, para. 
4, 8 U.S.T. 899, 909, T.l.A.S. No. 3853 at 909 (effective June 16, 1957). 
168. Libra Bank, 676 F.2d 47, 50. 
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use in quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, are provisional remedies auth-
orized to assure that prevailing parties will have meaningful 
recoveries. 169 
467 
The court held that the language at issue did not unequivocally ex-
press the will of the parties to waive immunity from prejudgment 
attachment.170 
In O'Connell Machinery Company v. M. V. Anwricana,171 the Sec-
ond Circuit considered whether language contained in the Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States 
and Italy112 explicitly waived the immunity of the Italian govern-
ment and its instrumentalities.173 Article XXIV(6) of the Treaty pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that Italy will not claim immunity "from 
suit, from execution of judgment, or from any other liability to which 
a privately owned and controlled enterprise is subject."174 Seeing 
no reason to depart from its holding in S & S Machinery Co. v. 
Masinexportimport, the court held that this language did not con-
stitute an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment 
attachment.175 
169. S & S Machinery, 706 F.2d at 417. 
170. Id. at 418. 
171. O'Connell, 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984). The plaintiff in O'Connell filed a complaint 
in federal district court demanding recovery in personam against Italia De Navigazione and 
recovery in rem against one of the Italia Di Navigazione's ships, the "M/V Americana," for 
damages to a generator shipped aboard the "Americana" from Italy to the United States 
in 1981. 
172. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, February 2, 1984, United States-
Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.l.A.S. No. 1965. 
173. Italia Di Navigazione was held by both the district court and the Court of Ap-
peals to be an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state under the definition provided 
in the FSIA. O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 116. Section 1603 of the FSIA defines foreign state to 
encompass any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Agency or instrumentality is 
defined to include an organ of a foreign state, a political subdivision of a foreign state, or 
any entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). A majority of Italia Di Naviga-
zione's shares are owned by the Societa' Finanziaria Maritime (FINMARE). O'Connell, 734 
F.2d at 116. FINMARE is under the direct control of the Instituto per la Ricostruzione In-
dustriale which is a public financial entity coordinating the management of commercial enter-
prises of the Italian government. The fact that the Italian government chose to establish 
two-tiered administrative agencies did not affect the Second Circuit's conclusion that the 
defendant was a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA despite plaintiffs argument 
that the Italian government's ownership was too remote to support an immunity claim under 
the FSIA. Id. at 116-17. 
174. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 172, art. XXIV(6). 
175. O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 117. 
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Plaintiffs in O'Connell further argued that the FSIA's curtail-
ment of the right of in rem attachment against vessels of foreign 
states unconstitutionally limited the judicial admiralty jurisdiction 
of the United States.176 The court rejected the argument on two 
grounds. First, it noted that, at the the time of adoption of the Con-
stitution, "foreign governments played little or no role in the 
merchant marine."177 As foreign governments developed such a role, 
immunity from arrest of foreign-owned and operated ships was 
recognized.178 The gradual judicial recognition of exceptions to this 
immunity led to the enactment of the FSIA.179 Thus, while the FSIA 
altered rights of litigants as they preexisted the act, it did not alter 
them as they preexisted the Constitution.180 Second, the Supreme 
Court has rejected the idea that the framers of the Constitution 
intended to preserve inviolate the then existing substantive 
maritime rights.181 
C. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: CROSS-CLAIMS 
AGAINST FOREIGN STATE NOT AUTOMATICALLY BARRED BY 
IMMUNITY ASSERTION: MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CAIRO V. UNIVERSE 
T ANKSHIPS, INC. 
In Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 182 the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether the 
defense of sovereign immunity is an absolute bar to the assertion 
of a cross-claim against a foreign state plaintiff. The court held that 
it is not.183 
In 1979, defendant Universe Tankships, a Liberian corporation, 
chartered one of its ships to Babanaft, a Panamanian corporation, 
which in turn chartered the ship to defendant, Claybridge Shipping 
176. Id. Here plaintiff relied on Article Ill, Section 2, clause i of the United States Con-
stitution which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. i. 
177. O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 117. 
178. Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 F.2d 562 (1926). 
179. O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 117. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. The Constitution merely adopted existing substantive maritime law, leaving 
Congress the power to modify or supplement it. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 
293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934). In the O'Connell court's view, "Congress did no more than exercise 
this power when it enacted section 1605(b)." O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 118. 
182. Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983). 
183. Id. at 87. 
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Co., another Panamanian corporation.184 Claybridge entered into a 
charter with the Ministry of Supply, Cairo, an "agency or instrumen-
tality" of Egypt and thus a foreign state under the FSIA.185 
Claybridge agreed to transport a cargo of grain from the Gulf of 
Mexico to Egypt. The Ministry, plaintiff in this action, filed suit 
in federal district court against Universe Tankships and Claybridge, 
alleging that the cargo was damaged to the extent of $2,000,000.186 
Babanaft successfully moved for leave to intervene187 as plaintiff 
against the two defendants.188 After opposing affidavits had been 
filed by all parties, Babanaft filed an amended complaint against 
the Ministry of Supply alleging that the Ministry had wrongfully 
halted discharge of the wheat, causing Babanaft to incur identified 
costs, among them the loss of the vessel's use during the eighty-
one days that the discharge was halted by the Egyptian 
authorities.189 
The district court held that the Ministry was immune from suit 
on the cross-claim.190 The court rejected two possible exceptions to 
immunity identified in the FSIA. First, it focused on the third clause 
of the "commercial activity" exception, § 1605(a)(2). Immunity is 
denied under this clause where the claim against the foreign 
sovereign is based on an act outside the United States causing a 
184. Id. at 82. 
185. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976). 
186. Universe Tankships, 708 F .2d at 82. 
187. Babanaft moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) & (b). This rule, in 
pertinent part provides: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action ... (2) when an applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest .... 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted 
to intervene in an action ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common. 
FED. RULE C1v. P. 24(a), (b). 
188. In its complaint annexed to the motion to intervene, Babanaft alleged that as the 
wheat was being unloaded at Port Said, Egypt, it was discovered that metal rust scale in-
side the vessel's cargo container had become intermixed with the grain. Egyptian consignees 
and port officials halted discharge of the grain for eighty-one days. Babanaft alleged that, 
as a result of this delay, it lost use of the vessel and incurred damages in the amount of 
$2,500,000. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 82-83. 
189. Id. at 83. 
190. Id. 
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direct effect within the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state outside the United States.191 The 
district court concluded that the eighty-one day delay in Port Said 
did not cause a direct effect in the United States.192 Secondly, the 
district court considered whether § 1607(b)193 provided an excep-
tion to immunity in this case. Section 1607(b) withdraws immunity 
as to any counterclaim against a foreign state "arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim 
of the foreign state."194 The court concluded that this exception did 
not apply to cross-claims.195 All of Babanaft's claims against the 
Ministry of Supply were dismissed.196 
The Second Circuit reversed, noting it had "no quarrel with 
the reasoning of the district court so far as it went. The trouble 
is that it did not go far enough."197 The district court, in focusing 
on the third clause of § 1605(a)(2), failed to recognize the relevance 
of the first clause of that section. This clause withdraws immunity 
in any case "in which the action is based upon a commercial activi-
ty carried on in the United States by the foreign state."198 Discuss-
ing this clause, the Second Circuit stated: 
Id. 
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). "This subsection denies immunity in any case: 
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of a foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." 
192. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 83. 
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 provides: 
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes 
. . . the foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any 
counterclaim -
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under sec-
tion 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against 
the foreign state; or 
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the claim of the foreign state, or 
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in 
amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state. 
Id. § 1607. 
194. Id. 
195. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 83. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 83-84. 
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
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When a foreign state has carried on a commercial activity 
within the United States, the first clause of § 1605(a)(2) thus 
withdraws immunity with respect to claims based not only on acts 
within the United States but also with respect to acts outside the 
United States if they comprise an integral part of the state's 
"regular course of commercial conduct" or "particular commercial 
transaction" "having substantial contact with the United States."199 
471 
Since Babanaft's claim was based upon plaintiff's entire .course of 
conduct, including the arrangement in the United States for the 
purchase and transportation of the wheat, rather than upon the 
isolated acts of the Ministry regarding the discharge of the cargo 
in Port Said, it is the first clause of § 1605(a)(2) that removes im-
munity in this case. 
The Court of Appeals then considered whether§ 1607's explicit 
withdrawal of the immunity defense for counterclaims "impliedly 
forecloses the application of § 1605 to cross-claims."200 The court 
noted that, in enacting§ 1607, Congress intended to reduce rather 
than enlarge the scope of sovereign immunity.201 The Ministry 
argued that the specific focus on counterclaims in§ 1607(b) indicated 
a congressional intent to exclude cross-claims from that section. The 
Court of Appeals agreed.202 The Ministry further argued that Con-
gress intended, by creating a separate exception for counterclaims, 
"to limit the other FSIA exceptions in §§ 1605 and 1607 to claims 
brought in separate actions against a foreign sovereign, thereby 
leaving sovereign immunity a bar to cross-claims of every stripe."203 
With this the court disagreed.204 Section 1605(a)(2), in the court's 
view, provided language broad enough to cover cross-claims and 
the court could "think of no good reason" why Congress would 
199. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 84. The course of commercial conduct of which 
the unloading of the wheat was only one part included the carriage of the wheat from a 
United States port under bills of lading executed pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act, 46 U .S.C. § 1300 et seq. (1982). That act defines "carriage of goods" as covering "the 
period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged 
from the ship." 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1982). 
200. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 85. 
201. Id. at 86. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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preserve sovereign immunity when a foreign state's commercial ac-
tivity is the subject of a cross-claim and withdraw immunity when 
that activity is the subject of a counterclaim.205 
Nothing in the Second Circuit's 1982 opinion in Kunstam-
mlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon206 compelled another conclusion. In 
Kunstammlungen, the court held that intervenor's cross-claim 
against a foreign state was barred by the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, "whose exception for counterclaims does not apply."207 
The distinguishing feature in Kunstammlungen208 was that the cross-
claim at issue there was not one for which immunity was withdrawn 
205. Id. The problem with this conclusion is that it renders § 1607(a) redundant since 
§ 1605(a)(2) would withdraw immunity over any claims covered by § 1607(a). The court 
acknowledges this but finds a sufficient explanation in Congress's desire to deal comprehen-
sively with counterclaims in § 1607 rather than omitting subsection (a) and creating doubt 
as to whether § 1605 applied to a counterclaim arising out of a commercial activity. 
206. Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). This case 
is a splendid example of how broad and comprehensive can be the task of the federal judge. 
The Kunstammlungen court characterized the case as follows: 
Id. 
The search for an answer to the deceptively simple question, "who owns the paint-
ings?," involves a labyrinthian journey through 19th century German dynastic law, 
contemporary German property law, allied Military law during the post-war oc-
cupation of Germany, New York State law, and intricate conceptions of succes-
sion and sovereignty in international law. 
207. Id. at 1160. 
208. Kunstammlungen involved an ownership dispute over two priceless Duerer paint-
ings. Prior to 1943, the paintings had been displayed at the Staatliche Kunstammlungen 
zu Weimar, a museum in Thuringia, Germany. To protect the artworks from bombardment 
they were moved to a nearby castle in 1943. They disappeared in the summer of 1945 at 
a time which coincided with the departure of American occupation forces. An American, 
defendant Elicofon, purchased the unsigned Duerers from an American ex-serviceman in 
1946. Defendant framed and displayed the paintings in his home. In 1966, he discovered 
the identity of the Duerers. The litigation in Kunstammlungen involved the efforts of four 
parties to establish ownership of the paintings. The Kunstammlungen zu Weimar [KZW] 
represented the interests of the German Democratic Republic, which claimed ownership 
under a 1921 agreement between the Grand Duke of Saxony Weimar and the Territory of 
Weimar, and a 1927 settlement with the Land of Thuringia, successor to the territory of 
Weimar. The Federal Republic of Germany, the original plaintiff, withdrew upon interven-
tion of the German Democratic Republic. Since the latter was not recognized by the United 
States and thus was barred from suing in United States courts at the time the suit was 
initiated, the Federal Republic had brought suit seeking custody of the paintings in order 
to restore them to the rightful owner. Id. The Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar, intervenor, 
claimed that the paintings remained the private property of the successive Grand Dukes 
of Saxony-Weimar and that title to the paintings was assigned to her by her husband, the 
late Grand Duke. Mr. Elicofon, the defendant, claims ownership based upon uninterrupted 
possession of the paintings for twenty years after his good-faith purchase of them. Id. 
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by § 1605.209 The Kunstammlungen court's reference to the 
counterclaim exception, according to the Universe Tankships court, 
was a recognition that the only argument, albeit a weak one, 
available to cross-claimant in Kunstammlungen was the "arising out 
of the same transaction or occurrence" language of§ 1607(b), a sec-
tion expressly limited to counterclaims.210 
IV. JURISDICTION 
A. GRAND JURY SUBPOENA POWER OVER NONRESIDENT 
ALIEN CORPORATION AFFIRMED: IN RE MARC RICH & CO. V. 
UNITED STATES 
In In re Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States,211 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order holding a 
foreign corporation, which did not do business in the United States 
or have offices here, in civil contempt for failure to comply with 
a subpoena duces tecum.212 
Marc Rich Company A.G. (Marc Rich) is a Swiss commodities 
trading corporation that does business internationally. Its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Marc Rich & Co. International Limited (Inter-
national), also incorporated in Switzerland, did business and had 
offices in New York.213 
In March, 1982, a federal grand jury in the Southern District 
of New York began investigating an alleged tax evasion scheme 
involving the two companies. The United States Government alleged 
that, through less than arms-length transactions, International 
divested to Marc Rich over twenty million dollars of taxable income 
209. The cross-claim filed by the Grand Duchess against the KZW sought payment of 
past-due and future annuities allegedly owed under the 1921 Agreement between the Grand 
Duke and the territory of Weimar. Id. at 1156. Certainly, this claim arose out of the same 
transaction, the 1921 Agreement, but could not be characterized as involving a commercial 
activity as defined in § 1605(a)(2). 
210. Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 87. 
211. In re Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 3555 (1983). For an extended analysis of In re Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, see 
Note, The Marc Rich Case: Extension of Grand Jury Subpoena Power to Nonresident Alien 
Corporations, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L & ECON. 97 (198.4). 
212. A subpoena duces tecum is a means by which a court commands a witness to pro-
duce documents or papers in the witness's possession or control. BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 
1279 (5th ed. 1979). 
213. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 665. 
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in 1980.214 Subpoenas duces tecum were served on International in 
March 1982 and on Marc Rich in April 1982.215 
Marc Rich moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that it was 
not subject to the court's jurisdiction and that, under Swiss law, 
the corporation was prohibited from providing the requested 
material.216 The district court rejected both grounds in denying the 
motion.217 Marc Rich thereafter failed to comply with the subpoena 
and was held in civil contempt by the court. A fine of $50,000 per 
day was imposed against the assets of International, the United 
States subsidiary .218 
Marc Rich appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, although on a different legal basis than that employed 
by the district court.219 The appeals court held that the United States 
could impose punishment on foreign corporations for the violation 
of federal income tax laws and that the United States Congress 
clearly intended to make the income tax laws applicable to such 
corporations.220 This power implies the power to investigate whether 
a crime has taken place.221 The power to conduct such an investiga-
tion in turn implies "the right to summon witnesses and to require 
the production of documentary evidence," a right essential to the 
grand jury's task.222 Thus, in the Second Circuit's opinion, "[s]o long 
as the court which must enforce the grand jury process can obtain 
personal jurisdiction of the summoned witness, the witness may 
214. Id. 
215. Both subpoenas ordered the companies to produce business records relating to 
crude oil transactions between the two in 1980 and 1981. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Marc Rich, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
25, 1982). In rejecting the jurisdictional challenge, the district court held that jurisdiction 
over Marc Rich was statutorily authorized by New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(l) 
and was constitutional under the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Slip op. at 16. Service on International was held to confer 
jurisdiction over Marc Rich. Id. at 17. 
In deciding the issue of whether Swiss law prohibited disclosure of business secrets 
to foreign governments and therefore required quashing the subpoena, the district court 
employed a balancing test between the interests of the United States and Switzerland. It 
concluded that the interests of the former in investigating violations of its tax law were 
weightier than the interests of the latter in protecting business secrets. Id. at 18. 
218. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 670. 
219. Id. at 665. 
220. Id. at 665-66. 
221. Id. at 66-67. 
222. Id. at 667. 
34
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1984], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/2
1984] 1983-1984 Survey of International Law 475 
not resist the summons on the sole ground that he is a non-resident 
alien."223 
The court then turned to the issue of personal jurisdiction over 
Marc Rich. Rejecting the lower court's use of the New York long-
arm statute,224 the court identified as the appropriate inquiry the 
nature and extent of Marc Rich's contacts with the United States, 
rather than with the State of New York.225 The contacts of Marc 
Rich with the United States were held to be sufficient to support 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.226 These contacts included 
adverse consequences in the United States resulting from Marc 
Rich's foreign activities227 and the likely occurre-nce of conspiratorial 
acts in this country.228 
Marc Rich argued that allowing the court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over it was the equivalent of creating a federal long-arm statute 
without congressional authorization. Since the jurisdictional reach 
of grand jury subpoenas is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a), and that 
section does not provide for jurisdiction over non-nationals located 
abroad, Marc Rich was beyond the subpoena power regardless of 
where service was actually accomplished.229 The Second Circuit re-
jected Marc Rich's argument. It noted that service had been ac-
complished in the United States and thus§ 1783(a) was irrelevant.230 
223. Id. 
224. N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 302(a) (McKinney 1972). 
225. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 667. 
226. Id. at 669. 
227. Id. at 667. The effects test found expression in§ 50 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICTS OF LAW (1971). 
A state has the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
which causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any 
cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of these effects and 
of the corporation's relationship to the state makes the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion unreasonable. 
Recognizing that the effects test must be applied with caution in cases with interna-
tional complications, the court nonetheless found it applicable here. 
228. Id. at 668. Two facts offered support for the conclusion that a conspiracy, if it ex-
isted, occurred at least in part in the United States. The tax law violation, if it occurred, 
occurred in cooperation with International which was doing business in New York. Further, 
two of the five members of Marc Rich's board of directors were also members of Interna-
tional's board and residents of the United States. At least one of these board members was 
alleged to have been directly involved in the tax diversion scheme. Id. 
229. Id. Section 1783 provides for service upon a "national or resident of the United 
States who is in a foreign country" for the "production of a specified document or other 
thing by him." 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1982). 
230. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 669. 
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The all writs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, conferred Congressional 
approval on judicial authority to issue subpoenas. However, the 
court "found it unnecessary to look at the all writs statute ... in 
fashioning a method of serving process where none was specifically 
provided by statute."231 
The crucial issue, in the court's view, was "how much of a 
jurisdictional showing the Government had to make in order to war-
rant the issuance of the subpoena."232 The trial court had required 
the government to show a good faith basis for asserting jurisdic-
tion. Once the government made such a showing,233 the burden 
shifted to Marc Rich to show lack of jurisdiction. The court held 
that Marc Rich had not met its burden.234 The Second Circuit held 
that this shift of the burden of proof was an error but that the error 
did not require reversal.235 The court held, "if the government shows 
that there is a reasonable probability that ultimately it will suc-
ceed in· establishing the facts necessary for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion, compliance with the grand jury's subpoena may be directed."236 
The court was concerned that requiring more of the Government 
"might well invert the grand jury function requiring that body to 
furnish answers to its questions before it could ask them."237 The 
Government, in the court's opinion, had made the necessary 
showing. 
Marc Rich is one of numerous cases recently decided by federal 
courts recognizing the power of United States courts over foreign 
defendants.238 Prior to Marc Rich, courts had held that parent cor-
porations can be required to produce documents possessed by a 
231. Id. at 668; 28 U.S.C. § 1651 reads: 
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court 
which has jurisdiction. 
232. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 669. 
233. Slip op. supra note 217 at 16. 
234. Id. at 17. 
235. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 699. 
236. Id. at 669, (quoting In re Harrisburg Grand Jury 79-1, 658 F.2d 211, 214 (3rd Cir. 
1981). 
237. Id. at 669, (quoting In re Harrisburg Grand Jury 79-1, 658 F.2d 211, 214 (3rd Cir. 
1981)). 
238. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 639 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1981); Bankers Trust 
Co. v. Worldwide Transp. Services, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1101 (D.C. Ark. 1982). 
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foreign subsidiary.239 The issue of power in the reverse situation 
is more complex, if only because of the nature of control between 
a parent and subsidiary company. 
That the United States Government had an interest in obtain-
ing the production of documents needed in connection with the in-
vestigation of a major tax fraud is apparent. What is not apparent 
is why the Government was so quick to reject other means of ob-
taining the documents that would have been less offensive to the 
Swiss government, which also had an interest in the issue.240 
Treaties, signed by both Switzerland and the United States, 
arguably provided means by, which to seek the Swiss government's 
assistance in obtaining the documents.241 Even if these treaties did 
not require Switzerland to assist United States efforts,242 the fact 
that Switzerland is party to them suggests she might.have provided 
assistance as a matter of comity in response to letters rogatory.243 
239. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 
1098 (1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International 
Paper Co., 72 ·F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Investigation of World Arrangements 
with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, 
13 F.R.D. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1952). 
240. The Swiss government's interest was twofold. First, Marc Rich was incorporated 
under the laws of Switzerland. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 665. Second, Marc Rich had argued 
before the trial court that Swiss law forbad Marc Rich's production of the documents 
demanded in the subpoena. Slip op. supra note 217, at 17. Marc Rich waived this issue on 
appeal. For an extended disucssion of issues raised when United States courts seek to compel 
production of documents protected by foreign laws, see Note, Compelling Production of 
Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American 
Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877 (1982). 
241. Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.l.A.S. No. 8302; Hague Convention for the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad, openedfor signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.l.A.S. No. 7444, Convention 
on Taxation, signed at Washington, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, 
T.l.A.S. No. 2316 (effective Sept. 27, 1951). 
242. The Justice Department argued that these treaties did not provide an affirmative 
means for obtaining the documents. The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
was unavailable because tax matters are expressly excluded from its application. Brief for 
the Government at 25, 707 F.2d at 663; Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, supra note 240, art. 2, para. l(c)(5). The Convention on Double Taxation was unavailable 
because it does not apply to criminal enforcement efforts. Brief for the Government at 25, 
707 F .2d at 663; Convention on Taxation, supra note 240. The Hague Convention for the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad was unavailable because Marc Rich involved criminal rather 
than civil or commercial matters. Hague Convention for the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 
supra note 240, art. 1. 
243. Letters rogatory are simply a means by which a court of one country formally 
requests that a court of another country assist the former's judicial efforts. BLACK'S LA w 
DICTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979). 
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As one author commented: "[i]f nothing else, the use of letters 
rogatory in Marc Rich would have demonstrated respect for Swiss 
sovereignty and Swiss jurisdiction over one of its nationals."244 
B. JURISDICTION OVER STATELESS VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS: 
UNITED STATES V. PINTO-MEJIA AND 
UNITED STATES V. HENRIQUEZ 
In 1980, Congress amended the 1970 Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act245 by adding a new section, 
codified at 21 U .S.C. § 955a.246 This section prohibits, inter alia, any 
person on board a vessel registered in the United States, or on 
board a vessel on the high seas subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, 
or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled 
substance.247 The section does not require proof that the destina-
tion of the substance be the United States. In effect,§ 955a extends 
the penal jurisdiction of the United States to non-United States 
citizens aboard stateless vessels on the high seas without regard 
to whether drugs on such vessels are destined for the United States. 
Section 995a greatly strengthened the hand of federal drug en-
forcement officers and federal prosecutors in their efforts to pre-
vent vast quantities of drugs from b~ing smuggled into the United 
States by sea.248 One commentator described the problem for pros-
ecutors prior to the enactment of § 955a: 
While the chief difficulty in prosecuting American citizens 
aboard United States vessels had been establishing beyond a 
244. Note, supra note 211, at 97. 
245. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1287 (1970). This act repealed all prior federal drug 
legislation and consolidated federal drug abuse and control laws in a single act. 
246. The Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, § l, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980). 
This amendment closed a gap in the 1970 act with regard to drug smuggling on the high 
seas. Prior to the 1970 act, federal law criminalized possession of illegal drugs on board 
United States vessels on the high seas; the 1970 act did not. See, Anderson, Jurisdiction 
Over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal Under Domestic and International Law, 
13 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 323, 324 (1982). The 1980 amendment initially was addressed only to 
United States nationals and vessels registered in the United States. H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4-5 (1979). As a result of testimony at hearings on the proposed statute, 
the jurisdictional provisions of the statute were extended to cover stateless vessels on the 
high seas. See, Comment, High Seas Narcotic Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overex-
tension of the Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 688 (1982). 
247. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982). 
248. For an excellent discussion of the ebb and flow of the United States Government's 
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reasonable doubt their intent to smuggle the drugs into the United 
States, several new problems were presented by the participation 
of foreign crew members aboard foreign or stateless vessels. In 
addition to the question of proof of intent, Federal prosecutors soon 
found that motions to dismiss their cases for lack of jurisdiction 
were received very sympathetically by the courts .... A trend very 
quickly developed whereby smugglers began to use foreign or 
stateless vessels exclusively. Upon apprehension, their foreign 
crews were usually simply deported, while the vessels and their 
cargoes were forfeited ... [w]ith little likelihood of imprisonment, 
the loss of an occasional cargo or vessel became just part of the 
cost of doing business to the drug smugglers.249 
Two cases250 decided by the Second Circuit Court of A p-
peals during the Survey years involve a new challenge to the pros-
ecution of alleged drug smugglers: the possibility that the exercise 
of penal jurisdiction by the United States over persons aboard 
stateless vessels on the high seas, absent proof of a sufficient nexus 
between the vessel and the United States, violates international 
law.251 
Most of the subject matter jurisdiction provisions of § 955a 
clearly are authorized by international law.252 The section provides 
for jurisdiction over United States citizens regardless of the loca-
tion or nationality of the vessel on which the citizen is 
efforts to stem the tide of drug smuggling, see, Anderson, supra note 246, at 323-27. 
249. Id. at 325-26 (citations omitted). 
250. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Henriguez, 
731 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1984). 
251. Although the issue is one involving the requirements of international law, the con-
text in which this issue is presented in Pinto-Mejia and Henriquez actually involves a nar-
rower question. The United States Congress may override international law, and United 
States courts are bound to follow congressional enactments that do so. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 
at 259; Henriguez, 731 F.2d at 134; Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 
468 F.2d 326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). Normally, however, courts will endeavor to interpret 
domestic legislation as consistent with the dictates of international law, unless the statute 
expressly provides that Congress intends to override international law. Spiess v. C. Itoh 
& Co., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982). Thus, if the Sec-
ond Circuit were to determine that international law required a state to show a nexus be-
tween a stateless vessel on the high seas and the state in order to exercise jurisdiction, 
it would attempt to reconcile the express legislative intent to conform to international law 
with the language of§ 955a(a). The court's holding in Pinto-Mejia and Henriquez, that inter-
national law imposed no nexus requirement, obviated the need for such a reconciliation. 
252. It is a violation of international law for a state to prescribe or enforce a rule of 
law that it has no jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 8 (1965). 
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apprehended.253 Citizenship is a traditional basis of jurisdiction under 
international law.254 The section establishes jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals aboard United States vessels wherever located.255 Such 
jurisdiction is authorized by international law under the territoriali-
ty principle, allowing a state to exercise jurisdiction over all viola-
tions of its laws committed on its territory .256 Vessels possess the 
nationality of their state of registry,257 and offenses committed on 
board a vessel registered in the United States are deemed to be 
committed on United States territory.258 Section 955a further pro-
vides for jurisdiction over persons on board any vessel inside the 
customs waters of the United States,259 a basis also supported by 
international law and practice.260 
The most controversial jurisdictional provision is that authoriz-
ing jurisdiction over persons on board stateless vessels on the high 
seas. Section 955a authorizes jurisdiction over persons on board 
vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high 
seas261 including vessels "without nationality or [vessels] assimilated 
to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) 
of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958."262 
253. 21 U .S.C. § 955a(b). 
254. Nationality or citizenship jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over all violations of 
a state's laws by its nationals regardless of where the violation occurs. C. HYDE. INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW§ 240 at 802-03 (2d rev. ed. 1947); J. MOORE. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 202 
at 255-56 (1906); L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 145 at 330 (8th ed. 1955). 
255. 21 U .S.C. § 955a(a). 
256. J. BRIERLY. THE LAW OF NATIONS 232 (5th ed.1955), J. MOORE. supra note 254, § 200 
at 225-26; Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 125 (1812). 
257. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 5 done, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962). 
258. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 
137, 155 (1933). 
259. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(c). United States custom waters extend up to twelve miles from 
the United States coast, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1976). The United States possesses jurisdiction 
within this zone for the limited purpose of insuring compliance with customs, fiscal and sanita-
tion laws. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 24, done, 
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964). 
260. The precise theoretical basis for international legal recognition of this jurisdic-
tional exercise does not seem to have been a matter upon which either jurists or scholars 
have agreed. See Lowe, The Development of the Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 52 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L.109 (1981); P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION, 
241-76 (1927). 
261. 21 U .S.C. § 955b(a). The high seas are defined as "all waters beyond the territorial 
seas of the United States and beyond the territorial seas of any foreign nation." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 955b(b). 
262. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(d). Under the Convention a vessel assimilated to a vessel without 
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Defendants in United States v. Pinto-Mejia263 and United States 
v. Henriquez264 were crew members on vessels intercepted by the 
United States Coast Guard on the high seas. Neither vessel was 
flying a flag when sighted by the Coast Guard.265 Both were headed 
on a course toward the United States mainland when sighted and 
both changed course away from the mainland after being sighted.266 
The Coast Guard boarded both vessels, discovered drugs and took 
defendants into custody.267 
In both cases the defendants made a two-pronged attack on 
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.268 First, they argued 
that the trial courts' rulings on statelessness were based on insuf-
ficient evidence. Second, they argued that, even if the evidence sup-
ported a finding of statelessness, jurisdiction based on the mere 
fact of statelessness exceeded jurisdictional limits imposed by in-
ternational law. Because the latter issue was identical in the two 
cases, it is discussed first. 
There was no question that if either vessel could claim the na-
tionality of a state, that state normally would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over offenses committed aboard that vessel on the high 
seas,269 depriving United States courts of jurisdiction. Defendants 
argued that, even if the vessels were without nationality, that is, 
stateless, the United States could not exercise jurisdiction in con-
formity with international law over a vessel on the high seas ab-
sent the showing of a nexus between the vessel and the United 
States.210 Since the government could not establish such a nexus, 
defendants argued, the indictments against them must be dismissed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected defen-
dants' argument and held that international law imposed no nexus 
requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction over stateless vessels.271 
nationality is a vessel that sails under the flags of more than one nation, using individual 
flags as a matter of convenience. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 257, art. 6, para. 2. 
263. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 248. 
264. Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 131. 
265. Id. at 135; Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 251. 
266. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 256; Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 133. 
267. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F .2d at 256; Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 133. 
268. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 256; Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 134. 
269. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 260. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 257, arts. 
5, 6. The rule establishing exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state applies unless otherwise 
provided in the Convention or other international treaties. Id. art 6, para. 1. 
270. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 258; Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 134. 
271. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 258; Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 134. 
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In the earlier of the two cases, United States v. Pinto-Mejia,212 the 
court offered the more comprehensive analysis of the issue. The 
court noted that international law defines for all states both rights 
of navigation on the high seas and responsibilities associated with 
the exercise of those rights.273 The grant of nationality of a state 
to a vessel serves to give the state exclusive jurisdiction over that 
vessel, offers protection of the laws of that state to those aboard 
such vessels, and assures a forum for the resolution of disputes in-
volving such vessels. The principles governing the national and in-
ternational status of flagships suggest "that a stateless vessel, which 
does not sail under the flag of one state to whose jurisdiction it 
has submitted, may not claim the protection of international law 
and does not have the right to travel the high seas with impunity."274 
The absence of such a right and the potential threat to the orderly 
use of international waters led the court to conclude that interna-
tional law does not restrict the right of any nation to subject 
stateless vessels to its jurisdiction.275 
While the conclusion that § 955a does not violate international 
law is undoubtedly correct, the court had available stronger sup-
port for the conclusion that it chose to construct. Other American 
courts have rejected any nexus requirement for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over stateless vessels,276 as have courts of other 
nations,277 international scholars,278 and the community of nations 
itself in the Law of the Sea Treaty.279 As one commentator has 
stated: 
272. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 248. 
273. Id. at 260. These responsibilities are general in definition. For example, the Con-
vention on the High Seas provides that each state must exercise its right "with reasonable 
regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of freedom on the high seas." Con-
vention on the High Seas, supra note 257, art. 2. 
274. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 260. 
275. Id. at 261. 
276. United States v. Martinez, 700 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub. nom., Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 
459 U.S. 1114 (1983); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982). 
277. See, e.g., Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine, (1948) A.C. 351, 367. 
278. 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1968); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 212, 222 (1967); 26 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
725 (1941); M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1084 (1962). 
279. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), art. 110 reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 1261 (1982). 
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The high seas are not res nullius, subject to the jurisdiction of no 
nation, but res communis, subject to the common jurisdiction of 
all nations. The protection that a registered vessel enjoys on the 
high seas is in the nature of an immunity ... against interference 
from other states. The flag state does not gain its exclusive 
jurisdiction through the registration of the vessel. Rather, but for 
the registration, other states would have jurisdiction as well. Any 
other result would end in chaos and anarchy on the high seas. If 
only the country of registration could exercise jurisdiction at all, 
under any circumstances, then an unregistered vessel would be 
immune from interference by anyone. This result cannot and has 
never been tolerated by the nations of the world.280 
Having decided that international law does not prohibit the 
exercise of jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas, the 
court turned to important evidentiary questions raised by the 
government's efforts in both cases to establish the stateless status 
of each vessel. In Pinto-Mejia, the district court cited four factors 
in support of its finding of statelessness: when first sighted, the 
vessel was not flying a flag; the vessel changed course away from 
the United States coast upon being sighted; flags of several nations 
were found on board the vessel; and the vessel's Venezualan 
registration had expired.281 The appellate court found the first two 
factors inadequate to support a finding of statelessness and the third 
factor inconclusive on the issue.282 Evidence admitted on the fourth 
factor violated the rule against admission of hearsay evidence.283 
The court remanded to the district court, stating "[i]f the govern-
ment adduces no new evidence sufficient to show that the [vessel] 
was stateless, the indictment must be dismissed."284 
In Henriquez, the court first addressed the issue of whether 
the question of statelessness had been preserved on appeal. The 
government asserted that it had not because the question went to 
the merits rather than to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
court.285 The court rejected this assertion on the ground that the 
parties and the district court clearly intended the issue to be 
280. Anderson, supra note 246, at 336. 
281. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F .2d at 256. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 257-58. 
284. Id. at 258. 
285. Henriquez, 731 F.2d at 135. 
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preserved for review.286 The evidence adduced by the government 
to show statelessness included: testimony that the vessel carried 
no flag, testimony that Honduras refuted registry and a Honduran 
certificate of non-registry.287 The defendants supported their argu-
ment of Honduran registry with the testimony of a private in-
vestigator who suggested considerable confusion on the part of the 
Honduran government with regard to registry of this vessel, 
specifically whether the certificate of registration produced by the 
defendants or the certificate of non-registration produced by the 
government was invalid.288 The appeals court remanded to the 
district court, first to consider the appropriate standard of proof 
on the issue of statelessness and second, to make appropriate find-
ings based on proof related to the day on which the search and 
seizure had been made.289 
V. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TAPING OF 
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN INFORMER IN 
NEW YORK AND ITALIAN CITIZEN IN ITALY DOES NOT 
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES V. 
ROMANO 
Matteo Romano and Armando Glorioso, appellants, were con-
victed of conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, heroin, 
in violation of federal law290 and were sentenced to ten years im-
prisonment.291 Both challenged their convictions based upon due pro-
cess violations292 and prosecutorial misconduct.293 Appellant Glorioso 
challenged his conviction on the additional grounds that evidence 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 135-36. 
288. Id. at 136. 
289. Id. at 136-37. The court noted that the evidence produced below was not narrowly 
focused on the status of the registration on January 6-7, 1983, the days on which the vessel 
was searched and seized; "(f]ar preferable would be a certificate of non-registry which satisfies 
the requirements of FED. R. Evm. 803(10) that speaks to the date of search and seizure, or a 
similarly valid showing of prior cancellation of the 1979 papers or non-registration in the 
first instance." Id. at 136. 
290. 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1982). 
291. United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 371 (2d Cir. 1983). 
292. Id. at 372. Specifically, appellants argued that the government, by inciting them 
to come to New York and providing them with the heroin, conducted itself in a manner 
"so repugnant and excessive" as to shock the conscience. The court rejected this due pro-
cess argument, holding that the government's conduct fell far short of the "demonstrable 
level of outrageousness" necessary to bar a conviction. Id. 
293. Id. at 374. The court noted that "[i]n order to justify dismissing an indictment for 
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presented to the grand jury was obtained by means that violated 
international law, Italian law and United States-Italian treaty 
obligations.294 
Armando Glorioso received telephone calls in Palermo, Italy 
from an informant for the United States Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration who previously had heroin dealings with Glorioso.295 
The informant called Glorioso from New York and allowed the 
government to tape the conversations. Glorioso introduceci Romano 
during one of the calls as someone interested in purchasing the 
"merchandise" that the informant had for sale. After a number of 
phone calls, through which the details of a heroin purchase were 
arranged, Glorioso and Romano traveled to New York and while 
there negotiated in person with the informant and an undercover 
agent for the government. After Romano had taken samples of the 
heroin · and left partial payment, Romano and Glorioso were 
arrested.296 
In rejecting appellant Glorioso's argument that the actions of 
the United States Government violated international law, Italian 
law and the treaty obligations of the United States to Italy, the 
court noted that, in the instant case, no officer or agent entered 
Italian territory. Further, Italy had not alleged any violation of her 
sovereign rights in connection with the case. Citing the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights297 and international 
scholars,298 the court noted that "[i]n international law an alien may 
assert a denial of justice only upon demonstration of grave or 
serious defects, such as refusal to grant rights reasonably to be 
expected by the accused in a criminal trial."299 The court then con-
cluded that the record could not be read to support a conclusion 
"that there has been such a manifest injustice as would violate any 
international standard of justice."300 Since Glorioso did not suffer 
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor must have knowingly withheld substantial evidence 
negating guilt ... where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict." 
Id. The prosecutor's alleged failure adequately to inform the grand jury on the legal ramifica-
tions of the entrapment defense did not rise to this level. Id. 
294. Id. at 372. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 375. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
298. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS§ 286 (6th ed.1963); HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER 
& SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 742-43 (1980). 
299. Romano, 706 F.2d at 375. 
300. Id. 
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a denial of justice, no principle of international law was violated. 
Glorioso and Romano voluntarily entered the United States and 
committed a crime and thus, the United States had the power to 
punish them. 
The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the 
Government's conduct in taping telephone conversations violated 
Italian law.301 The Italian Penal Code prohibits the unauthorized in-
stallation of equipment for the purpose of intercepting telephone 
communications.302 The installation in this case took place in New 
York. Italian law generally does not provide for its own extrater-
ritorial application,303 but even if it did, the United States is not 
required, by international law, to execute the penal laws of another 
country.304 Thus, "[s]ince the recording of appellants' conversations 
took place within the United States, questions of illegality under 
Italian law are immaterial."305 
Appellant's final argument, that recording of his conversations 
violated provisions of the United States-Italian Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation,306 similarly was rejected by the 
court.307 As to searches and seizures, that treaty simply requires 
that nationals of each state be treated by the other state no less 
favorably than its own nationals. The lower court measured the 
legality of the taping by the same standard that would govern the 
taping of conversations between American citizens and held that 
the Government's conduct met the standard.308 
301. Id. at 376. 
302. Id.; Italian Penal Code (C.P.), art. 617. 
303. Romano, 706 F .2d at 376. 
304. The Antelope, 23 U.S. [10 Wheat] 66, 123 (1825); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 
657, 666 (1982). 
305. Romano, 706 F.2d at 376. 
306. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 172. 
307. Romano, 706 F.2d at 376. 
308. Id. at 377. 
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